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Can We Please Stop Doing This? By the way, Postema was Right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dennis Patterson1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While legal philosophy has its own unique set of questions and problems, one activity it 
shares with many other areas of philosophy is the urge to find the essence of “law.” 
Whether expressed as “essence,” “necessary and sufficient,” or “nature,” the enterprise is 
finding the features of law that set it apart from other normative phenomena.  																																																								
1 Professor of Law and Chair in Legal Philosophy and Legal Theory, European University Institute, 
Florence; Board of Governors Professor of Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA; 
Professor of Law and Chair in International Trade and Legal Philosophy, Swansea University, Wales, UK. 
Thanks to Bosko Tripkovic and Sofie Møller, my superb research assistants. This chapter draws on material 
from two previous articles of mine. They are: ‘Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals’ (2012) 25 Ratio 
Juris 47 and ‘Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts’ (2006) 26 OJLS 545. 
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Many philosophers have abandoned the search for the essential features of many things. 
The conventional wisdom now seems to be – roughly – that the world divides in natural 
kinds and other (social or artefactual) kinds.  
 
Legal philosophers have not given up the search for the essence of law. In this way, they 
are rather different from philosophers in many other areas of the discipline.  
 
In this article, I will consider three attempts to identify the essence or nature of law. I will 
argue that each attempt fails for different reasons. If these attempts to identify the essence 
of law fail, what are we to make of these failures? Are they simply three different failed 
attempts or do they indicate something more? 
 
I will then consider Gerald Postema’s effort to point to a different way of thinking about 
law and what legal philosophers ought to be doing when we do jurisprudence. Postema’s 
work is a model of how to do legal theory: it is methodologically sophisticated and it 
solves problems not otherwise amenable to resolution.  
 
Joseph Raz 
 
 
Raz’s account of authority is an essential feature of his view of the nature of law. He 
maintains that the law necessarily claims to be a genuine and not merely de facto 
authority. For law to fulfill the mediating role that it claims for itself, on Raz’s view, the 
law must issue dictates that can be readily understood and acted upon. More specifically, 
people need to be able to grasp legal norms (i.e., identify those norms as valid) 
independently of their identification and consideration of the (dependent) reasons for 
those norms. It is for this reason that Raz’s position can be characterized as exclusive 
legal positivism. Exclusive legal positivists insist that the content of law must come from 
social sources alone. Raz articulates the sources thesis as follows: “All law is source-
based. […] A law is source-based if its existence and content can be identified by 
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reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument.”2 Although 
some read him as making a moral argument,3 I think it more accurate to read Raz as 
making a conceptual or metaphysical claim about the nature of law. In this regard, Raz 
himself has been somewhat equivocal on the matter, sometimes speaking of “the” 
concept of authority, “our” concept of authority, or “concept(s) of authority.”4 
 
The problem with Raz’s position is that he makes no arguments directly in support of his 
claims for necessity. This is no small omission, for the success of Raz’s account of law’s 
authority depends upon the strength of his claim that the concept of law is special in that 
its meaning is not (solely) a function of linguistic usage and, further, that the content of 
the concept is (at least in part) dictated by something other than conventions for the use 
of the word. 
 
I believe that Raz needs to answer the question of the nature of law with an account of 
concepts. To answer the question of the nature of law, we need to know what sort of 
concept law is. Once we have identified what kind of concept law is, we can move 
toward answering what sort of conceptual analysis is necessary for a concept like law. In 
short, an account of concepts is a necessary preliminary to answering the question “What 
is the nature of law?” 
 
The conventional metaphysical wisdom is that concepts divide up into at least two 
categories: natural kind concepts and artefactual kinds. Natural kind concepts are those 
whose essence is dictated by a microstructural element, such as atomic formula or DNA. 
Artefactual kinds are products of human invention. These social constructs are the stuff 
of John Searle’s “Institutional Facts”: their existence depends upon our attitudes or 
																																																								
2 J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1994) 210-1. 
 
3 SR Perry, ‘Hart’s Methodological Positivism’ in JL Coleman (ed), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the 
Postscript to The Concept of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 
4 J Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’ (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 
1005-6, 1008, 1010-1. 
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intentions.5 Where does Raz’s account of the nature of law fall into this divide? It is not 
at all clear. 
 
On the one hand, Raz says this about the nature of law: “A theory consists of necessary 
truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of law.”6 But Raz also 
maintains that “[i]n large measure what we study when we study the nature of law is the 
nature of our own self-understanding.”7 It is difficult to see how necessary truths can 
arise out of the self-understanding of participants in a practice. Raz seems to want an 
account of the nature of law that identifies necessary truths at the same time it identifies 
something seemingly contingent about law (i.e., our self-understanding of it). Putting 
together necessity and contingency seems to me to be the next step in the development of 
exclusive legal positivism. Until Raz accomplishes this task, his claims for law’s 
authority are unconvincing. 
 
 
Robert Alexy 
 
Robert Alexy argues that the concept of law has “necessary” features. Alexy eschews talk 
of natural kinds, arguing instead for “necessary” features of law. Alexy is wholly unclear 
about what he means by “necessity.” For this reason, his claims regarding law’s 
necessary features are unconvincing. Here is Professor Alexy’s own description of his 
enterprise: 
 
Enquiring into the nature of something is to enquire into its necessary properties. 
Thus, for the question “What is the nature of law?” one may substitute the 
question “What are the necessary properties of law?” Necessary properties that 
are specific to the law are essential properties of law. Essential or necessary 
properties of law are those properties without which law would not be law. They 																																																								
5 JR Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York, Free Press, 1995) 31–52. 
 
6 J Raz, ‘Can There Be a Theory of Law’ 328. 
 
7 Ibid., 331. 
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must be there, quite apart from space and time, wherever and whenever law 
exists. Thus, necessary or essential properties are at the same time universal 
characteristics of law. Legal philosophy qua enquiry into the nature of law is, 
therefore, an enterprise universalistic in nature.8 (Citation omitted) 
 
Every sentence in this paragraph raises more questions than it answers. Let us take them 
one at a time. 
 
1. “Enquiring into the nature of something is to enquire into its necessary properties.” 
This is merely definitional: Identifying the nature of something is identifying what is 
essential to it. 
 
2. “Thus, for the question ‘What is the nature of law?’ one may substitute the question 
‘What are the necessary properties of law?’.” This seems to be the previous question but 
now with a focus on law. The nature of law is what is necessary to law. 
 
3. “Essential or necessary properties of law are those properties without which law would 
not be law.” This is just a restatement of the previous sentence. If there were necessary 
properties to law then, by definition, law would not be law if it lacked those necessary 
properties.9 
 
 4. “They must be there, quite apart from space and time, wherever and whenever law 
exists.” The previous sentence is extended with the assertion that the necessary features 
of law are “there” quite apart from space and time. But this is just a bald assertion. No 
argument has been provided and it certainly does not follow from the previous sentences, 																																																								
8 R Alexy, ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’ (2008) 21 Ratio Juris 281, 290. 
 
9 In the first passage I quoted, Alexy appears to be distinguishing between (a) necessary properties of law 
and (b) essential properties of law, namely, essential properties are those necessary properties that are 
specific (unique?) to law. In the current passage, he seems not to be distinguishing—or perhaps just not 
emphasizing in this passage—between the two. This could be characterized as a form of Aristotelianism: 
“Man is necessarily an animal, but essentially a rational animal, because although animality and rationality 
are both necessary properties, rationality is a specific—unique—property of man.” My thanks to Hans 
Oberdiek for this point. 
 
Sofie Møller  11/3/2015 1:14 PM
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which were merely definitional or mere logical transformations. 
 
5. “Thus, necessary or essential properties are at the same time universal characteristics 
of law.” The word “thus” implies that this sentence states a proposition that flows from 
the previous sentence or sentences. I fail to see how this is the case. 
 
6. “Legal philosophy qua enquiry into the nature of law is, therefore, an enterprise 
universalistic in nature.” This sentence is question-begging because we have no idea what 
a “universalistic enterprise” consists in.10 It has something to do with enterprises and 
activities that are “necessary” but more detail is needed. 
 
Alexy identifies two features of law that he deems “essential.” These two features are 
what make law what it is. He writes: 
 
Two properties are essential for law: coercion or force on the one hand, and correctness or 
rightness on the other. The first concerns a central element of the social efficacy of law, the 
second expresses its ideal or critical dimension. It is the central question of legal philosophy to 
ask how these two concepts are related to the concept of law and, through it, to each other. All – 
or at least nearly all – questions of legal philosophy depend on the answer to this question.11  
 
For Alexy, law has two necessary features, coercion and correctness/rightness. One 
question we might ask is whether Alexy uses the word “necessary” in the same way when 
he refers to both coercion and correctness. It seems he does not. Consider: 
 
 
To include coercion in the concept of law is adequate to its object, the law, for it 
mirrors a practical necessity essentially connected with law. Coercion is 
necessary if law is to be a social practice that fulfils its basic formal purposes as 																																																								
10 Grant that X is a necessary feature of law and Y is both a necessary and essential feature of law so that 
law has universal and necessary features: How does it follow that an enquiry into law is a “universalistic 
enterprise”? Thanks again to Hans Oberdiek for this point. 
 
11 R Alexy, ‘The Nature of Legal Philosophy’ (2004) 17 Ratio juris 156, 163. 
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defined by the values of legal certainty and efficiency. This practical necessity is 
the reason why the conceptual necessity implicit in the use of language is based 
not merely on a convention but also on the nature of the thing to which the 
concept refers. It is, in this sense, an absolute necessity.12 (reference omitted) 
 
 
In this passage, Alexy characterizes coercion as a “practical necessity” of law. This 
contrasts with a far more rigorous form of necessity, which Alexy characterizes thus: 
 
The possibility of defining the concept of nature as it appears in sentences of the 
form “What is the nature of φ?,” namely, by means of the concept of necessity, 
allows for the substitution of the question “What is the nature of law?” by the 
question “What are the necessary properties of law?” This question leads, by 
means of the concept of necessity (and its relatives, analyticity, and the apriori), 
to the specific character of law. The question of what is necessary turns, when 
connected with the question of what is specific, into the question of what is 
essential. This is the area of the specific character thesis.13 
 
It seems that coercion is “practically necessary” to law but not necessarily conceptually 
necessary. If this understanding of Alexy’s position is correct, two points are salient. 
First, the claim that coercion is a necessary feature of law has been the subject of 
widespread commentary and is, to say the least, problematic.14 There are all sorts of 																																																								
12 Alexy, ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’ 293. Alexy also draws a distinction between “practical” 
and “conceptual” necessity: “Including coercion in the concept of law is adequate to its object, the law, 
because it mirrors a practical necessity necessarily connected with law. Coercion is necessary if law is to be 
a social practice that fulfills its basic formal functions as defined by the values of legal certainty and 
efficiency as well as possible. This practical necessity, which seems to correspond to a certain degree to 
Hart’s [1994, 199] ‘natural necessity’ [. . .], is mirrored in a conceptual necessity implicit in the use of 
language. This shows that language, which we use to refer to social facts, is inspired by the hermeneutic 
principle that each human practice is to be conceived of as an attempt to carry out its functions as well as 
possible. Unravelling this connection between conceptual and practical necessity makes clear in what sense 
coercion belongs as a necessary property to the nature of law” Alexy, ‘The Nature of Legal Philosophy’ 
163. 
 
13 Alexy, ‘The Nature of Legal Philosophy’ 162–3. 
 
14 Think of Hart’s discussion of power-conferring rules in HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994). 
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normative practices that are recognized as “law” but which lack the coercive aspects of 
municipal law.15 For example, the claim that international law is not “really law” because 
of the lack of coercive enforcement has been severely criticized. I will not rehearse the 
arguments here. I will only say that the claim is hotly contested. 
 
The second point is that if Alexy is claiming that coercion is a “practically necessary” 
feature of law, then his claim is far softer than the use of the word “necessity” implies. As 
he himself says, his claim for coercion is “teleological” and not, it seems, conceptual. In 
short, Alexy seems to say that without coercion, law would not be efficacious. This is not 
a conceptual but a practical claim. Whatever its merits, the claim will be sustained at the 
level of facts and not in the nature of concepts.16 Alexy’s claims for the dual nature thesis 
are far stronger and do, as he himself says, implicate deep philosophical issues (Alexy 
mentions analyticity and the a priori).17 It is here that Alexy substantially raises the stakes 
for his deep philosophical claims about the nature of law. Before turning to Alexy’s 
arguments in detail, a little stage setting is in order. 
 
Alexy wants to show that the claim to correctness is part of the very idea of “law.” That 
is, he wants to show that it is analytically true that the claim to correctness is a 
constitutive feature of law. To do this, he has to show that the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic statements can be maintained. It was precisely this claim that 
Quine put in question. Quine argued that the difficulty with analyticity was 
demonstrating any principled difference between analyticity and co-extensionality.18 
Consider the predicates “creature with kidneys” and “creature with a heart.” These two 
predicates are true of the same objects (i.e., people, animals, etc). Compare this with 																																																								
15 For example, Soft Law, Lex Mercatoria, ADR, the law of indigenous peoples, and internet law (e.g., 
ICANN and UDRP). 
 
16 I would add that the claim to “universality” is undercut as well. 
 
17 Alexy, ‘The Nature of Legal Philosophy’ 162–3. 
 
18 This discussion of Quine has benefitted from P Hanna and B Harrison, Word and World: Practice and 
the Foundations of Language (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) 270–4. For an excellent 
introduction to the issues, with a wide-ranging tour of the history of the debates, see C Juhl and E Loomis, 
Analyticity (London, Routledge, 2010). 
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“bachelor” and “unmarried man.” These two predicates are true of exactly the same 
objects (i.e., some men). We intuitively think the difference between these two cases is a 
matter of contingency in the first (i.e., a “trick of nature”) and “necessity” in the second. 
So what explains the difference? This is where Quine’s criticism bites. 
 
We intuitively want to say that “bachelor” and “unmarried man” are equivalent in 
meaning, that is, that they are synonyms. But what do we mean when we say that two 
terms are synonymous? We mean they are interchangeable salva veritate. But this will 
not work because it embroils the notion of synonymy with the very necessity it was 
meant to explain! Without a prior account of the notion of analyticity, there is no hope of 
making sense of the distinction between co-extensionality and synonymy. 
 
Let us consider Quine’s point by comparing sentences. Consider the following two sets of 
sentences: 
 
Set I. 
(1) Some doctors that specialize on eyes are ill-humored. 
(2) Some ophthalmologists are ill-humored. 
(3) Many bachelors are ophthalmologists. 
(4) People who run damage their bodies. 
(5) If Holmes killed Sikes, then Watson must be dead. 
Set II. 
(6) All doctors that specialize on eyes are doctors. 
(7) All ophthalmologists are doctors. 
(8) All bachelors are unmarried. 
(9) People who run move their bodies. 
(10) If Holmes killed Sikes, then Sikes is dead.19 
 																																																								
19 This discussion is taken from G Rey, ‘The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction’ in E Zalta (ed), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (August 14, 2003, with substantive revision August 15, 2008) 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/analytic-synthetic 
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Most people, indeed almost all, would see real differences between the sentences in Sets I 
and II. The sentences in Set I are claims that may or may not be true. To know whether 
these sentences are true, one would need to investigate the underlying facts. The same 
cannot be said of the sentences in Set II. These sentences seem to state truths that are 
“true” but in a different sense than the sentences in Set I. The sentences in Set II are true 
in the sense that a denial of any one of them would, in some sense, be unintelligible. 
Philosophers say that the sentences in Set I are “synthetic” and those in Set II “analytic.” 
It is this distinction that Quine disputes. 
 
There is little doubt of the felt sense of truth in the sentences in Set II. How could one 
deny that all ophthalmologists are doctors? An ophthalmologist is a “doctor for the eyes.” 
Here Quine and Ullian introduced the metaphor of a “web of belief” to illustrate this 
sense of inevitability and truth.20 They argued that the only reason we regard sentences 
like those in Set II as “analytic” or “true independently of reality” is that such sentences 
express thoughts or beliefs that are central to our world view. This centrality in no way 
makes such beliefs unrevisable. On the contrary, just as Kant mistakenly thought about 
geometry, even our most cherished beliefs can be revised in the face of recalcitrant 
evidence.21 
 
How does Quine’s work connect with Alexy’s claims about the nature of law? Alexy 
wants to use the power of necessity, analyticity and the a priori to underwrite his claims 
about the nature of law. That is all well and good. But he owes us a complete account of 
what he means by “necessity.” He has yet to provide one. Not only that, he needs to 
provide an account that at least addresses Quine’s criticisms. Doing so is, pardon the pun, 
necessary for his project. 
 
																																																								
20 WVO Quine and JS Ullian, The Web of Belief, 2nd edn (New York, Random House, 1978). 
 21	On	Kant’s	account,	geometry	is	unrevisable	in	virtue	of	being	synthetic	a	priori.	Quine also pointed 
out that many unrevisable beliefs do not seem analytic (e.g., “The earth has existed 
for more than five years ” and “Some people have eyes” ), WVO Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, 
Mass., Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960); Rey, ‘The 
Analytic/Synthetic Distinction’. 
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Ronald Dworkin 
 
I will argue that Dworkin’s incorporation of natural kinds semantics into his 
jurisprudence is problematic for three reasons. First, I attack the fundamental premise of 
Dworkin’s argument; to wit, the claim that the meaning of natural kind terms such as 
‘gold’, ‘tiger’, and ‘water’ is a function of the deep structure of the things to which these 
terms refer. Proponents of natural kinds make two claims. Metaphysically, natural kinds 
are identical with their underlying natures. Semantically, natural kinds are directly 
referential; that is, the meaning of natural kind terms is a function of direct reference 
cashed out in terms of microstructure. I grant, arguendo, the metaphysical thesis but deny 
the semantic thesis. In short, my claim is that there is no necessary relationship between 
natural kinds and the meaning of natural kind terms. If this argument is successful, then 
the premise from which Dworkin’s argument proceeds necessarily fails. 
 
My second argument grants, arguendo, the premise that there are natural kinds. But 
Dworkin’s argument for hidden essences for political and legal kinds fails because, 
unlike science, in matters of value there is no agreed way to adjudicate disputes over the 
existence and features of such essences. Without epistemic or methodological 
confirmation, debates about the ‘real’ meaning of political and legal concepts will not be 
resolved by appeals to ‘the hidden nature of things’. 
 
My final argument also grants, arguendo, that there are natural kinds. But if Dworkin is to 
be taken at his word about similarities between natural kind and legal concepts,22 then 																																																								
22 I am mindful that Dworkin says that there are ‘instructive similarities’ (R Dworkin, ‘Hart’s Postscript 
and the Character of Political Philosophy’ (2004) 24 OJLS 1, 12) to be drawn between natural kind 
concepts like ‘water’, ‘tiger’ and ‘gold’ and political concepts like ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’, and ‘equality’. It 
is difficult to discern just how far Dworkin intends to take this comparison. Michael Green has recently 
argued that Dworkin commits a ‘fallacy’ (Green dubs it ‘Dworkin’s Fallacy’) by grounding an interpretive 
theory of law in an interpretive theory of meaning. See MS Green, ‘Dworkin’s Fallacy, or What the 
Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach Us about the Law [In English]’ [2003] Virginia Law Review 1897, 
1909–10. Dworkin describes Green’s account of his argument as a ‘surprising misreading’. R Dworkin, 
Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 2006) 226. Additionally, Dworkin states that legal 
concepts are ‘interpretive concepts’ and not natural kind concepts. (‘I explicitly rejected a natural kind 
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there is a material—indeed, significant—shift in his general jurisprudential position. If 
legal and political concepts are best understood as akin to natural kinds, then judges 
should ignore precedents whenever those precedents fail to reflect the judge’s sense of 
the (natural kind) meaning of the term in question. In Dworkin’s terminology, the ‘fit’ 
side of the fit/justification picture of adjudication becomes superfluous. In short, 
adjudication would be ‘justification all the way down’.23 
 
 
 
Gerald Postema 
 
Gerald Postema’s article “Protestant Interpretation and Social Practices”24 is the single 
best work devoted to the mature thought of Ronald Dworkin. The reason it is the best is 
simply stated: unlike all other commentators, Postema uncovers the deep philosophical 
presuppositions of Dworkin’s approach and shows why they are implausible. In addition, 
and in the course of making his critical points about Dworkin, Postema articulates an 
approach to jurisprudence that is singularly clear and persuasive. It is this aspect of the 
article that marks it as a major contribution to legal theory. 
 
Postema’s central contention is that law is an intersubjective practice. When you remove 
the intersubjective element, you lose the explanatory power needed to understand law. 
Before we get to Postema’s account of how best to understand law, let me review his 
treatment of Dworkin. 
 
Law is an interpretive concept. The best way to understand the practice of law is as an 																																																																																																																																																																					
interpretation of any of the concepts of law’. Ibid., 227. One is left to wonder just what Dworkin means 
when he states there are ‘instructive similarities’ to be drawn between legal and natural kind concepts. The 
essence of natural kind concepts is necessity, specifically metaphysical necessity (see for example SA 
Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980). If legal and natural 
kind concepts are not similar in terms of metaphysical necessity, it is rather unclear in just what sense 
Dworkin thinks they are ‘similar.’ 
 
23 I owe this way of making the point to John Oberdiek. 
 
24 GJ Postema, ‘“Protestant” Interpretation and Social Practices’ (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 283. 
 13 
exercise in constructive interpretation. As for the nature of law, Dworkin argues that “(1) 
that his theory fits legal practice as we know it at least as well as (or better than) other 
viable general interpretations, and (2) that it commands our allegiance because it portrays 
the law as serving a fundamental political ideal to which we are properly committed, 
namely, integrity.”25 In sum, “Dworkin’s philosophical account of law . . . is built on two 
fundamental notions: interpretation and integrity.”26 
 
As he says in the article, Postema focuses on Dworkin’s core idea of law as an exercise in 
(constructive) interpretation. The problem is with the “protestant” dimension of 
Dworkin’s account. 
 
For Dworkin, there are three stages of interpretation in law. Postema explains: 
 
At the preintepretative stage the interpreter collects the rules, standards, and 
descriptions of characteristic behavior and activities of participants which are 
widely agreed among participants to be elements of the practice in question. This 
provides the "raw data" of the interpretive theory. Dworkin admits that this 
"data" is never, strictly speaking, "uninterpreted", (LE, 66, 422) but, as we will 
see later, it must be "raw" or "uninterpreted" relative to the practice. That is, it is 
behavior (or rules) abstracted from its meaning in the practice.27 
 
At the interpretative stage, the interpreter "proposes a value for the practice by 
describing a scheme of interests or goals or principles the practice can be taken to 
serve or express or exemplify" (LE 52). This interpretation must both fit 
("enough" of) the practice and show the practice to have normative appeal, i.e, it 
must provide a justification of its main elements and of participation in it. This 
interpretation, at least in the ideal case to which actual interpretations 																																																								
25 Ibid., 284. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 This is how I understand Dworkin's reference to "raw behaviorial data" at R Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1986) 52 and in personal conversation with him. I believe he is 
committed to this view of the "data” by his assumption, central to his account of the possibility of 
controversy in social practices, that the "data" are common, but the interpretations or theories of them are 
not. See below Section I.E. 
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approximate, will take the form of an abstract or general theory (LE 90), a 
systematically ordered set of explicitly articulated general purposes, aims, or 
principles from which the various more concrete elements of the practice can be 
seen to "follow" (in some suitably wide sense of "follow"). 
 
Finally, with this theory in hand, interpreters at the post-interpretive or 
"reforming" stage may adjust their views of the requirements of the practice so as 
better to serve the justification outlined in the theory. Note that, on this view, it is 
misleading to describe the activity at this stage as "changing the practice." What 
the "reforming" interpreter regards as requirements of the practice may appear, 
from the pre-interpretive stage, to be substantial changes of (deviations from) 
accepted practice. But if the interpretative attitude has taken hold in a practice, 
consensus requirements collected at the preinterpretive stage have no final 
authoritative status. They are, relative to the practice, as yet (virtually) 
uninterpreted, a collection of actions, decisions, and even rules in search of an 
interpretation. Once the interpretive task is undertaken, views about what the 
practice requires may (and, when the practice is healthy, will) differ substantially. 
But these differing views must, on Dworkin's view, be regarded not as proposals 
for changes in the practice, but as conflicting views about what the practice as 
presently constituted really is and what, as a result, it really requires of 
participants. In this respect, theory drives practice, for the practice is what the 
(best) general interpretive/justificatory theory says it is: claims about what in 
concrete cases the practice requires, permits, or sanctions are true in virtue of 
their following from the best such theory of the practice.28 
 
It is in his treatment of the third stage of interpretation that Dworkin sows the seeds for 
the failure of his position. In interpreting the practice, each participant “is trying to 
discover his own intention in maintaining and participating in that practice . . . in the 
sense of finding a purposeful account of his behavior he is comfortable in ascribing to 
himself.”29 Postema notes that Dworkin “explicitly portrays social interpretation ‘as a 
																																																								
28 Postema, ‘“Protestant” Interpretation and Social Practices’ 291-3. 
29 Dworkin, Law’s Empire 58. 
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conversation with oneself (LE 58).’”30 While the object of interpretation is the same for 
every participant, “interpretations are private.”31 Theory precedes practice.32 And what is 
common in interpretations? Postema answers: “That which appears common in the 
practice is merely the overlap of extensions of the (more or less explicit) interpretive 
theories of individual participants.”33 
 
The root of the problem with Dworkin’s theory of law lies in his approach to 
interpretation: “it makes interpretation of social practices insufficiently practical, 
insufficiently intersubjective, and thus (at least in the case of law) insufficiently 
political.”34 In Dworkin’s hands, participants in law are reduced to “windowless social 
monads.”35 Thus, Postema challenges “Dworkin’s theory of law only indirectly, by 
challenging the general theory of interpretation on which it rests.”36 
 
The interpretive attitude is rare. Although he does not put it this way, Postema rejects the 
Heidegger/Gadamer view that interpretation is a fundamental feature of everyday 
existence. Rather, Wittgenstein got it right: interpretation is a second-order activity one 
engages in when understanding breaks down. Postema makes this point indirectly in this 
passage, citing Wittgenstein: 
 
to understand a practice is first of all to grasp "how to go on", and that involves 
neither merely acquiring a repertoire of routine reactions to routine situations, nor 
grasping a general proposition (let alone a systematic theory) logically 
independent of the practice activities. Rather, it involves learning a discipline or 																																																								
30 Postema, ‘“Protestant” Interpretation and Social Practices’ 287. 
 
31 Ibid., 300. 
 
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Ibid., 301. 
 
35 Ibid. 
 
36 Ibid. 
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mastering a technique. It involves the capacity to relate different items in the 
world of the practice and to locate apparently new items in that world, to move 
around with a certain ease in the web of relationships created by it. This is 
interpretation, in the straightforward sense that it involves a sure grasp of the 
"meaning" of the various actions in the repertoire in question through their places 
in the practice, and a grasp of how the practice fits together, how it makes 
sense.37 
 
It is virtually impossible to find a practice exemplifying Dworkin’s claim that the point or 
purpose of a practice can be stated independently of the rules and particulars of the 
practice.38 Worse, even if we grant Dworkin’s claim, it is not clear that the object of 
competing interpretations can be identified independently of any interpretation.39 The real 
business of interpretation is “uncovering together the meaning of our common action.”40 
Interpretive activity is “essentially interactive.”41 We now shift to Postema’s positive 
position. 
 
Postema’s first example is friendship.42 When we “interpret” what friendship means, we 
do not focus on what our culture means by “friendship.” Rather, we give our attention to 
“what our friendship, our relationship, means or requires.”43 Sharing a friendship, 
Aristotle noted, is not like two cows sharing a field. Rather, it engenders “common 
perception, a common perspective, and common discourse. Friendship is characterized . . 
. not by sympathy or consensus (homonoia), but by common deliberation, and thought.”44 
																																																								
37 Ibid., 303-4. 
 
38 Ibid., 305. 
 
39 Ibid., 306. 
 
40 Ibid., 308. 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 Ibid., 308ff. 
 
43 Ibid., 309. 
 
44 Ibid. 
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The same interactive process is exemplified in the work of courts, lawyers, and citizens.45 
“Far from being ‘a conversation with oneself,’ such interpretive activity is, when properly 
understood, essentially a conversation with other participants.”46 
 
Postema’s conclusions: 
1. Understanding a practice is mastery of a discipline.47 
2. To learn a social practice is to become acquainted through participation, wherein 
one comes to grasp the common meaning of the practice.48 
3. The common world of the practice is not constructed out of individual 
interpretations of it. Rather, “we have expectations of the behavior and 
expectations of others because we recognize that we participate in a common 
world.”49 
 
A final and all-important point: conflict (interpretation) presupposes consensus. Although 
he does not put it this way, Postema’s point comes directly from Wittgenstein. All 
interpretation (a second-order activity) presupposes understanding (how to go on in a 
practice). The need for interpretation is rare.50 But when it arises, consensus is the 
background against which interpretation takes place. 
 
Postema’s final point: Dworkin is part of the very tradition he criticizes. The unity of law 
does not depend on some structure. Rather, it involves a shared capacity to move within a 
web of practice.51 Postema was the first person to make this point. He was right. But 																																																								
 
45 Ibid., 310. 
 
46 Ibid., 312-3. 
 
47 Ibid., 313. 
 
48 Ibid. 
 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 See B Leiter, ‘Explaining Theoretical Disagreement’ (2009) 76 The University of Chicago Law Review 
1215. 
 
51 Postema, ‘“Protestant” Interpretation and Social Practices’ 318. 
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many in the analytic legal philosophy simply ignore the position and the arguments.  
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